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The following document contains supplementary information for the article “Credibly Comitting to Property
Rights: The Roles of Precedent and the Constitution.” The first section provides the supplementary analyses
referred to in the “Robustness Checks” section of the manuscript. The second section provides the questions
from the Comparative Constitutions Project used to create the de jure measure of property rights referred to
in the manuscript.
Supplementary Analyses
The supplementary analyses reported below are described in the “Robustness Checks” section of the manuscript.
For each robustness check, the results from models estimated using all of the observations and the observations
from only LDCs are reported.1 In addition to the estimates from the additional regression models, interaction
figures, similar to Figures 1-3 in the manuscript, are displayed for the models reported in Table 1 of the
manuscript that are not accompanied by such figures (e.g. Models 3-5 for all observations) and for the
additional regression models reported here.
1In analyses unreported in the manuscript or here, I also assessed if the models are robust to alternate measures of de facto
property rights. Specifically, I used two alternative measures of property rights protection: the average of the “law and order”
and “investment profile” variables from the International Country Risk Guide (The PRS Group 2005), as used by Knack and
Keefer (1995), Barro (1996), Clague et al. (1996), and Lane and Tornell (1996), and the sum of all the variables, except “ethnic
tensions,” in the IRIS dataset (Knack 1997), as used by Knack and Keefer (1995). The estimates from Models 3, 4, and 5 are
not robust to these alternate indices of de facto property rights protection. However, this is most likely due to a change in
the way precedent is measured when these indices are used. Although these alternate indices provide estimates of the level of
property rights protection each year, they span approximately 12 fewer years than Gwartney’s (2009) measure. This meant that
I was forced to reduce the number of years over which precedent was measured from fifteen to six when using the alternate
indices. I firmly believe this change yields an unreliable measure of precedent, and as a result, I do not report the models using
these alternative measures of de facto property rights.
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Figure S1. Manuscript Figure 1 with All Observations
Notes: The lines depicted in this figure are based on coefficient estimates from manuscript Table 1, Model 3
estimated using all observations.
Figure S2. Manuscript Figure 2 with All Observations
Notes: The lines depicted in this figure are based on coefficient estimates from manuscript Table 1, Model 4
estimated using all observations.
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Figure S3. Manuscript Figure 3 with All Observations
Notes: The lines depicted in this figure are based on coefficient estimates from manuscript Table 1, Model 5
estimated using all observations.
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Table S1. Alternate Model Specifications
Variables Model 3a Model 4a Model 5a
All LDCs All LDCs All LDCs
De Facto P.R. -15.55* -32.87 3.38 0.53 -29.78 -86.85
(8.52) (22.41) (3.66) (5.03) (26.96) (60.74)
P.R. Precedent -15.67** -17.38 -20.11 -33.16
(7.47) (12.45) (23.41) (36.06)
D.F. x Precedent 21.86** 44.85 36.45 103.82
(9.96) (26.95) (31.29) (71.17)
De Jure P.R. -2.12 -7.06 -16.01 -37.57
(5.12) (5.46) (34.18) (47.13)
D.F. x D.J. -1.06 6.62 37.04 114.30
(6.86) (8.70) (47.26) (99.00)
D.J. x Precedent 14.02 35.56
(40.89) (54.57)
D.F. x D.J. x Precedent -39.63 -127.58
(55.24) (116.84)
GDP (in PPP $1,000’s) -0.35*** -1.03*** -0.36*** -1.03*** -0.36*** -1.05***
(0.09) (0.15) (0.09) (0.16) (0.10) (0.15)
Human Capital -0.21 0.42 -0.42 0.08 -0.21 0.15
(0.38) (0.43) (0.43) (0.52) (0.41) (0.52)
Investment 0.20*** 0.16 0.20** 0.18 0.21*** 0.20*
(0.08) (0.11) (0.08) (0.11) (0.08) (0.11)
Government Consumption -0.05 0.06 -0.03 0.09 -0.03 0.12
(0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.12)
Trade 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04** 0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Inflation 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.08
(0.07) (0.04) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05)
Pop. Growth -0.08 -0.39** -0.07 -0.48** -0.10 -0.44**
(0.17) (0.19) (0.17) (0.20) (0.17) (0.20)
Democracy
Corruption
R2 (within Country) 0.31 0.53 0.29 0.53 0.32 0.55
Countries 103 68 103 68 103 68
Observations 276 155 276 155 276 155
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Table S1. cont.
Variables Model 3b Model 4b Model 5b
All LDCs All LDCs All LDCs
De Facto P.R. -17.65** -37.96* 3.07 0.77 -28.78 -65.02
(8.20) (22.34) (3.57) (4.46) (27.66) (57.79)
P.R. Precedent -17.59** -18.74* -20.46 -33.76
(6.71) (10.94) (24.86) (31.48)
D.F. x Precedent 24.58** 50.70* 35.35 77.58
(9.53) (26.46) (32.26) (67.98)
De Jure P.R. -2.88 -8.70* -13.53 -38.10
(5.27) (4.53) (34.94) (43.89)
D.F. x D.J. -0.25 5.06 30.45 67.63
(6.43) (6.97) (46.28) (102.81)
D.J. x Precedent 10.92 34.10
(41.05) (49.96)
D.F. x D.J. x Precedent -31.65 -71.49
(53.94) (121.81)
GDP (in PPP $1,000’s) -0.36*** -0.97*** -0.37*** -0.97*** -0.37*** -1.00***
(0.10) (0.17) (0.10) (0.17) (0.11) (0.18)
Human Capital -0.12 0.26 -0.39 -0.35 -0.14 -0.25
(0.37) (0.38) (0.42) (0.45) (0.40) (0.46)
Investment 0.21*** 0.16 0.20** 0.19* 0.22*** 0.19*
(0.08) (0.11) (0.08) (0.11) (0.08) (0.11)
Government Consumption -0.09 0.01 -0.05 0.05 -0.06 0.05
(0.10) (0.09) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11)
Trade 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03** 0.00 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02)
Inflation -0.00 0.05 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.07*
(0.07) (0.03) (0.08) (0.04) (0.08) (0.04)
Pop. Growth -0.11 -0.45** -0.09 -0.53** -0.13 -0.51**
(0.17) (0.20) (0.18) (0.21) (0.17) (0.22)
Democracy -0.66 0.64 -0.20 0.80 -0.51 0.94*
(0.54) (0.66) (0.62) (0.53) (0.63) (0.55)
Corruption -0.21 -0.33** -0.22 -0.43*** -0.21 -0.41***
(0.18) (0.13) (0.20) (0.14) (0.21) (0.14)
R2 (within Country) 0.33 0.58 0.30 0.60 0.34 0.61
Countries 97 63 97 63 97 63
Observations 267 147 267 147 267 147
Notes: The table displays coefficient estimates from 12 fixed-effects regression models with clustered, robust
standard errors in parentheses. The constant as well as binary variables for country and year are omitted
from the table. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: Pr(t=0)<0.01=***, Pr(t=0)<0.05=**,
Pr(t=0)<0.1=*. The model numbers are the same as those in Table 1 of the manuscript with the changes
to each model indicated by a letter. In this table, all of the variable typically included in an extreme
bounds analysis (EBA) are included in models whose name ends in an “a.” Variables controlling for the
levels of democracy and corruption in each country are included in models whose name ends in a “b.”
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Figure S4. Effect of De Facto Property Rights by Precedent for Alternate Model Specifications
Notes: The lines depicted in this figure are based on coefficient estimates from Table S1, Models 3a and 3b.
Figure S5. Effect of De Facto Property Rights by De Jure Property Rights for Alternate Model Specifications
Notes: The lines depicted in this figure are based on coefficient estimates from Table S1, Models 4a and 4b.
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Table S2. Alternate Samples
Variables Model 3d Model 4d Model 5d
All LDCs All LDCs All LDCs
De Facto P.R. -19.59** -22.63* 6.62 6.01 -27.18 -9.78
(8.35) (12.10) (4.07) (4.34) (29.59) (72.80)
P.R. Precedent -19.32*** -12.13* -21.48 14.38
(7.21) (6.76) (22.53) (43.89)
D.F. x Precedent 28.67*** 33.94** 38.14 23.03
(9.66) (14.85) (32.06) (86.77)
De Jure P.R. -0.51 -1.66 -9.32 27.80
(4.34) (2.92) (37.28) (56.88)
D.F. x D.J. -3.93 -3.19 22.68 7.78
(7.89) (8.50) (56.49) (114.19)
D.J. x Precedent 8.19 -29.65
(40.12) (63.28)
D.F. x D.J. x Precedent -27.81 -20.04
(60.47) (132.90)
GDP (in PPP $1,000’s) -0.46*** -1.31*** -0.46*** -1.31*** -0.48*** -1.32***
(0.14) (0.18) (0.14) (0.18) (0.15) (0.19)
Human Capital -0.02 1.05 -0.21 1.03 0.07 0.98
(0.45) (0.63) (0.48) (0.65) (0.48) (0.61)
Investment 0.21*** 0.20*** 0.19** 0.24*** 0.22*** 0.23***
(0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
R2 (within Countries) 0.40 0.63 0.35 0.62 0.41 0.65
Countries 84 54 84 54 84 54
Observations 174 94 174 94 174 94
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Table S2. cont.
Variables Model 3d Model 4d Model 5d
All LDCs All LDCs All LDCs
De Facto P.R. -15.21* -32.63* 3.51 1.28 -28.42 -42.43
(7.95) (18.06) (3.22) (4.37) (23.98) (46.57)
P.R. Precedent -14.65* -17.09 -17.51 -12.90
(7.39) (11.33) (19.68) (27.32)
D.F. x Precedent 21.91** 44.95** 34.45 52.64
(9.50) (21.99) (27.67) (54.75)
De Jure P.R. -2.39 -4.42 -19.26 -7.43
(4.58) (4.87) (29.85) (38.30)
D.F. x D.J. -0.62 5.57 40.27 37.35
(6.36) (8.10) (44.17) (86.36)
D.J. x Precedent 17.00 4.51
(35.75) (45.06)
D.F. x D.J. x Precedent -40.88 -36.74
(51.14) (103.10)
GDP (in PPP $1,000’s) -0.42*** -1.09*** -0.39*** -1.06*** -0.40*** -1.07***
(0.09) (0.15) (0.09) (0.17) (0.09) (0.15)
Human Capital -0.34 0.72 -0.33 0.58 -0.03 0.74
(0.44) (0.54) (0.45) (0.63) (0.46) (0.57)
Investment 0.24*** 0.15 0.21*** 0.19 0.24*** 0.16
(0.07) (0.13) (0.07) (0.14) (0.07) (0.13)
R2 (within Countries) 0.32 0.45 0.29 0.43 0.32 0.45
Countries 103 67 103 68 103 68
Observations 273 153 274 154 273 153
Notes: The table displays coefficient estimates from 12 fixed-effects regression models with clustered, robust
standard errors in parentheses. The constant as well as binary variables for country and year are omitted
from the table. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: Pr(t=0)<0.01=***, Pr(t=0)<0.05=**,
Pr(t=0)<0.1=*. The model numbers are the same as those in Table 1 of the manuscript with the changes
to each model indicated by a letter. In this table, the time period from 2000-2005 is omitted from models
whose name ends in a “c.” The top 1% of influential observations, as indicated by Cook’s D, are omitted
from models whose name ends in a “d.”
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Figure S7. Effect of De Facto Property Rights by Precedent for Alternate Samples
Notes: The lines depicted in this figure are based on coefficient estimates from Table S2, Models 3c and 3d.
Figure S8. Effect of De Facto Property Rights by De Jure Property Rights for Alternate Samples
Notes: The lines depicted in this figure are based on coefficient estimates from Table S2, Models 4c and 4d.
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Table S3. Alternate Operationalization of Dependent and Independent Variables
Variables Model 3e Model 4e Model 5e
All LDCs All LDCs All LDCs
De Facto P.R. -15.27** -25.56* 6.37** 8.14*** -34.65* -21.34
(6.64) (15.21) (2.60) (2.70) (18.97) (53.31)
P.R. Precedent -14.42** -11.15 -28.10* -10.81
(6.78) (8.78) (16.10) (28.64)
D.F. x Precedent 21.62*** 35.69* 45.47** 36.61
(7.86) (18.66) (21.31) (63.21)
De Jure P.R. 1.73 2.33 -24.48 4.77
(2.95) (2.52) (25.05) (39.39)
D.F. x D.J. -6.43 -9.43* 42.62 -8.91
(5.19) (5.00) (35.21) (93.81)
D.J. x Precedent 28.08 -1.41
(29.00) (45.17)
D.F. x D.J. x Precedent -51.95 -1.02
(39.59) (109.95)
GDP (in PPP $1,000’s) -0.45*** -1.16*** -0.43*** -1.11*** -0.46*** -1.17***
(0.09) (0.17) (0.09) (0.19) (0.09) (0.18)
Investment 0.23*** 0.14 0.23*** 0.18 0.23*** 0.15
(0.07) (0.11) (0.07) (0.13) (0.07) (0.12)
Human Capital 0.56* 1.03** 0.50 1.00* 0.53* 1.09*
(0.31) (0.48) (0.36) (0.56) (0.30) (0.55)
R2 (within Countries) 0.32 0.45 0.30 0.44 0.33 0.46
Countries 88 56 88 56 88 56
Observations 250 135 250 135 250 135
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Table S3. cont.
Variables Model 3f Model 4f Model 5f
All LDCs All LDCs All LDCs
De Facto P.R. -11.91 0.99 7.51** 4.15 9.58 151.51***
(7.43) (7.90) (3.44) (2.75) (30.40) (29.97)
P.R. Precedent -12.79** 2.42 3.51 97.89***
(6.12) (3.84) (26.32) (18.86)
D.F. x Precedent 18.42** 5.15 -2.24 -173.42***
(8.30) (9.73) (32.75) (34.80)
De Jure P.R. 3.15 0.14 26.12 125.60***
(4.19) (2.43) (36.95) (25.23)
D.F. x D.J. -6.25 -0.31 -36.78 -229.77***
(6.66) (4.46) (49.55) (49.79)
D.J. x Precedent -26.03 -141.16***
(40.92) (27.81)
D.F. x D.J. x Precedent 33.90 272.01***
(53.09) (59.36)
GDP (in PPP $1,000’s) -0.31*** -0.91*** -0.30*** -0.86*** -0.31*** -0.84***
(0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.09) (0.11) (0.05)
Human Capital 0.16 0.93** -0.01 0.96* 0.14 1.16***
(0.28) (0.45) (0.29) (0.51) (0.28) (0.39)
Investment 0.17 -0.03 0.16 0.03 0.19* -0.08
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.10) (0.09)
R2 (within Countries) 0.52 0.87 0.47 0.84 0.53 0.93
Countries 83 53 83 53 83 53
Observations 128 72 128 72 128 72
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Table S3. cont.
Variables Model 3g Model 5g
All LDCs All LDCs
De Facto P.R. -16.55 -44.67 8.63 -49.37
(12.77) (30.70) (36.31) (94.61)
P.R. Precedent -16.63 -26.35 6.83 -8.75
(11.07) (18.39) (32.95) (50.02)
D.F. x Precedent 20.27 57.50 -8.77 66.47
(14.38) (36.82) (40.58) (114.32)
De Jure P.R. 30.38 16.11
(48.50) (63.15)
D.F. x D.J. -40.69 28.40
(63.78) (143.20)
D.J. x Precedent -37.83 -17.83
(55.47) (72.87)
D.F. x D.J. x Precedent 46.01 -41.60
(71.20) (172.04)
GDP (in PPP $1,000’s) -0.41*** -1.46*** -0.43*** -1.52***
(0.10) (0.26) (0.11) (0.26)
Human Capital -0.43 0.73 -0.46 0.43
(0.50) (0.88) (0.58) (1.50)
Investment 0.21*** -0.03 0.22*** -0.03
(0.07) (0.11) (0.07) (0.11)
R2 (within Countries) 0.41 0.57 0.43 0.59
Countries 84 56 84 56
Observations 176 94 176 94
Notes: The table displays coefficient estimates from 16 fixed-effects regression models with clustered, robust
standard errors in parentheses. The constant as well as binary variables for country and year are omitted
from the table. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: Pr(t=0)<0.01=***, Pr(t=0)<0.05=**,
Pr(t=0)<0.1=*. The model numbers are the same as those in Table 1 of the manuscript with the changes
to each model indicated by a letter. In this table, the Barro and Lee measure of educational attainment,
rather than the Cline Center for Democracy measure, is used to operationalize human capital in models
whose name ends in an “e.” All of the economic variables are operationalized using 10 year increments –
1985-1995 and 1995-2005, rather than 5 year increments, in models whose name ends in an “f.” Lastly,
precedent is operationalized using the previous 4 periods, rather than the previous 3 periods, in models
who name ends in a “g.” Since model 4 does not include the measure of precedent, it was omitted from
this last robustness test.
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Figure S10. Effect of De Facto Property Rights by Precedent for Alternate Operationalizations
Notes: The lines depicted in this figure are based on coefficient estimates from Table S3, Models 3e, 3f, and
3g.
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Figure S11. Effect of De Facto Property Rights by De Jure Property Rights for Alternate Operationalizations
Notes: The lines depicted in this figure are based on coefficient estimates from Table S3, Models 4e and 4f.
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Table S4. De Facto Property Rights Regressed on Covariates
Variables Model 6 Model 7
All LDCs All LDCs
De Facto P.R.t−5 0.07 0.11
(0.09) (0.12)
De Jure P.R. -0.10 -0.19 -0.07 -0.16
(0.18) (0.19) (0.18) (0.19)
GDP Growth (%)t−5 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
GDP (in PPP $1,000’s) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Human Capital -0.03* -0.03 -0.02* -0.03
(0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04)
Investmentt−5 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Government Consumptiont−5 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Tradet−5 -0.00* -0.00 -0.00* -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Inflactiont−5 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Pop. Growtht−5 -0.00 -0.02 -0.00 -0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Democracy 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.06
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
R2 (within Countries) 0.24 0.23 0.24 0.24
Countries 103 68 103 68
Observations 276 155 276 155
Notes: The table displays coefficient estimates from 4 fixed-effects regression models with clustered, robust
standard errors in parentheses. The constant as well as binary variables for country and year are omitted
from the table. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: Pr(t=0)<0.01=***, Pr(t=0)<0.05=**,
Pr(t=0)<0.1=*. Both models assesses the effects of de jure property rights and lagged economic growth
on de facto property rights, with Model 6 omitting lagged de facto property rights and Model 7 including
it.
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Table S5. Investment Regressed on Covariates
Variables Model 8 Model 9
All LDCs All LDCs
De Facto P.R. 15.10 17.31 10.48 12.96
(10.84) (25.21) (11.09) (23.79)
P.R. Precedent 8.05 9.40 2.82 5.75
(8.50) (11.34) (8.54) (11.41)
D.F. x Precedent -15.73 -12.51 -9.85 -7.07
(12.68) (31.47) (12.73) (29.90)
Investmentt−5 0.17** 0.17*
(0.07) (0.10)
GDP (in PPP $1,000’s) -0.17** -0.26 -0.22*** -0.51
(0.08) (0.33) (0.07) (0.32)
Human Capital -1.09** -0.35 -0.81* 0.04
(0.53) (0.78) (0.49) (0.75)
Government Consumption -0.41*** -0.14 -0.38*** -0.13
(0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13)
Trade 0.01 0.09** 0.01 0.08**
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Pop. Growth 0.61*** 0.28 0.62*** 0.29
(0.19) (0.23) (0.18) (0.24)
Inflation 0.00 -0.01 0.03 0.01
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
R2 (within Country) 0.22 0.25 0.26 0.29
Countries 103 68 103 68
Observations 276 155 276 155
Notes: The table displays coefficient estimates from 4 fixed-effects regression models with clustered, robust
standard errors in parentheses. The constant as well as binary variables for country and year are omitted
from the table. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: Pr(t=0)<0.01=***, Pr(t=0)<0.05=**,
Pr(t=0)<0.1=*. Both models assesses the effects of de facto property rights and precedent on investment,
with Model 8 omitting lagged investment and Model 9 including it.
20
Figure S13. Effect of De Facto Property Rights on Investment by Precedent
Notes: The lines depicted in this figure are based on coefficient estimates from Table S5, Models 8 and 8.
21
Index of De Jure Property Rights Protection
Subcomponent CCP Question Coding
Protection of
Property Rights
v513. EVIDENCE - Does the constitution regulate the
collection of evidence?
+1 if yes
v569. EXPROP - Can the government expropriate pri-
vate property under at least some conditions?
+3 if no
v570. EXPRCOMP - What is the specified level of
compensation for expropriation of private property?
+1 if specified
v572. EXPLIM - What limits/conditions are placed
on the ability of the government to expropriate private
property? Responses used — #2 - payment must be
made within specified time limits; #4 - only allowed
through legal process or court decision
+1 for each limit
v579. TRANSFER - Does the constitution mention the
right to transfer property freely?
+1 if yes
v580. TESTATE - Does the constitution provide for a
right of testate, or the right to transfer property freely
after death?
+1 if yes
v581. INHERIT - Does the constitution provide for
inheritance rights?
+1 if yes
v582. INTPROP - Does the constitution mention any
of the following intellectual property rights? Responses
used — #1 - Patents; #2 - Copyrights; #3 - Trademarks;
#96 - other, please specify in the comments section
+1 for each mention
v587. PROPRGHT - Does the constitution provide for
a right to own property?
+1 if yes
12 Possible Points
Judicial
Independence
v308. LEVJUD - Does the court system provide for any
of the following? OR v309. JUDCRTS - For which of the
following specialized courts does the constitution contain
provisions? Response used — #2 - Constitutional Court
+1 if supreme court
or constitutional
court present
v310. JUDIND - Does the constitution contain an ex-
plicit declaration regarding the independence of the cen-
tral judicial organ?
+1 if yes
v315. HOCOP (v360. CONCOP) - Does the constitution
provide for judicial opinions of the highest ordinary court
(Constitutional Court)?
+1 if yes
v326. SUPNOM (v350. CONNOM) - Who is involved
in the nomination of judges to the highest ordinary
court (Constitutional Court)? OR v327. SUPAP (v351.
CONAP) - Who is involved in the approval of nomi-
nations to the highest ordinary court (Constitutional
Court)?
+1 if process speci-
fied
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Subcomponent CCP Question Coding
Judicial
Independence,
cont.
v326. SUPNOM (v350. CONNOM) - Who is involved in
the nomination of judges to the highest ordinary court
(Constitutional Court)? Responses used — #6 - Judicial
Council or Commission; #7 - Judiciary, other than Ju-
dicial Council or Commission OR v327. SUPAP (v351.
CONAP) - Who is involved in the approval of nomi-
nations to the highest ordinary court (Constitutional
Court)? Responses used — #6 - Judicial Council or
Commission; #7 - Judiciary, other than judicial coun-
cil/commission
+1 if the judiciary
is involved
v329. SUPTERM (v355. CONTERM) - What is the
maximum term length for judges for the highest ordinary
court (Constitutional Court)?
+1 if life tenure
v330. SUPTERMN (v356. CONLIM) - What restric-
tions are in place regarding the number of terms of
members of the highest ordinary court (Constitutional
Court) may serve?
+1 if only one con-
secutive term
v362. INTERP - To whom does the constitution assign
the responsibility for the interpretation of the constitu-
tion? Responses used — #1 - Any Ordinary Court; #2
- Constitutional Court/Council; #3 - Supreme Court
Only; #4 - Special Chamber of the Supreme Court
+1 if part of judi-
ciary
v364. CHALLEG - Who has standing to initiate chal-
lenge to the constitutionality of legislation? Responses
used — #7 - Lawyers; #8 - Public; #9 - the Courts
+1 if lawyers, the
public, or the courts
v382. JUDSAL - Does the constitution explicitly state
that judicial salaries are protected from governmental
intervention?
+1 if yes
10 Possible Points
Fair and
Efficient
Adjudication
Process
v341. ORDAPPE - Does the constitution mention the
right to appeal ordinary court decisions to a higher court?
+1 if yes
v517. RGHTAPP - Do defendants have the right to
appeal judicial decisions?
+1 if yes
v525. FAIRTRI - Does the constitution provide the right
to a fair trial?
+1 if yes
v526. SPEEDTRI - Does the constitution provide for
the right to a speedy trial?
+1 if yes
v551. RULELAW - Does the constitution contain a
general statement regarding rule of law, legality, or
Rechtsstaat (the German equivalent)?
+1 if yes
v552. EQUAL - Does the constitution refer to equal-
ity before the law, the equal rights of men, or non-
discrimination?
+1 if yes
6 Possible Points
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